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Abstract
Using a basic monetary model, we assess the effectiveness of stock prices as a leading indicator of
the East Asian currency crisis in 1997 and 1998. Stock prices are incorporated into a monetary model,
through the wealth effect postulated by Friedman [J. Pol. Econ. 96 (1988) 221]. In addition to the
domestic stock price, we also incorporate the stock prices of Hong Kong, China and Japan. Using
monthly data, the results indicate that the domestic stock price, the Hong Kong stock price and
particularly US prices are significant leading indicators of the crisis. Causality tests suggest evidence
of bi-causality between the stock markets and foreign exchange markets.
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1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to primarily determine whether the domestic stock market can be
used as a leading indicator during a regional currency crisis, as in East Asia during the late
1990s. In addition we investigate whether the major stock markets within East Asia had any
effect on the currencies suffering the crisis and can also be used as an early warning system.
A particular feature of the East Asian crisis was the almost simultaneous decline in asset
prices and currencies, as international investors moved their capital out of the respective
domestic markets. This resulted in a subsequent depreciation of the exchange rate as the
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domestic currency was sold. However, the degree of severity of the crisis varied across East
Asia, as did the extent of the decline in the domestic stock markets.
To date most models for predicting currency crises have concentrated on leading indicators
from either the banking sector or the current account (e.g., Kaminsky, Lizondo, & Reinhart,
1998; Kwack, 2000). When stock prices have been included, it has been limited to only
domestic stock prices. In this paper we suggest a simple monetary based model, in which
stock prices can be incorporated as a leading indicator of currency crises. We also investigate
whether foreign stock prices are a significant leading indicator, based on three theories
concerning the origins of the South East Asian currency crisis.When investigating the
relationship between stock prices and exchange rates, the main concern is usually over the
direction of causality between these variables. There are theoretical reasons for causality to
run in both directions, as suggested by Bahmani-Oskooee and Sohrabian (1992) and Granger,
Huang, and Yang (2000). The empirical evidence is equally ambiguous, although Granger
et al. (2000) finds evidence of causality running from stock markets to exchange rates during a
currency crisis. In this study we too assume causality is from stock prices to exchange rates.
Following the introduction, we assess the interrelationship between stock prices and
exchange rates during a currency crisis. We then derive a simple model of currency crises,
in which stock markets are incorporated through the demand for money function. The next
section describes the data and assesses the results from the empirical models. Finally we
give our conclusions and suggest some implications for future policies.
2. Currency crises and stock prices
The main attempt to incorporate the domestic stock market into empirically based
currency crisis models has been Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) and Kaminsky et al.
(1998). These models incorporate a number of real, financial and political variables in
purely empirical models, to identify which are significant and also the length of the
signalling horizon. The domestic stock markets are generally found to be a significant
leading indicator of currency crises, over a number of different currency crises in the recent
past. In the study by Kaminsky et al. (1998), stock prices are found to be the fourth best
predictor of currency crises.
There has been a certain amount of debate in the literature as to the direction of causality
between stock prices and exchange rates. Granger et al. (2000) show that causality runs
from domestic stock prices to exchange rates. They offer some theoretical support for a bi-
directional relationship between the stock market and foreign exchange market, but only
over the short run. They argue that a change in exchange rates would change the market
value of all firms that trade internationally. This would depend on whether the firms are net
importers or exporters, such that if in aggregate most firms were net exporters, a
devaluation would have a beneficial affect on those firms profitability and therefore stock
market value. This causal relationship is termed the traditional approach, although it does
not specify the sign of the effect.
In contrast to this approach, both Bahmani-Oskooee and Sohrabian (1992) and Granger
et al. (2000) stress the importance of the portfolio approach to analysing the relationship
between stock prices and exchange rates. This suggests that a rise in stock prices, increases
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the domestic wealth of investors, facilitating a rise in the demand for money. Following the
consequent rise in interest rates, capital is attracted into the domestic economy appreciating
the domestic currency. This approach assumes there is a negative relationship between
stock prices and exchange rates, with causality running from the stock market to the foreign
exchange market. Wu (2001) provides evidence of the negative relationship between
equities and exchange rates in South East Asia. This explanation is the most relevant to this
relationship during a currency crisis. We have conducted a set of Granger causality tests
between domestic stock prices and exchange rates, as with other studies, there is evidence
of bicausality between the stock market and foreign exchange markets. When causality
runs from stock prices to the exchange rate, there is a negative relationship, which suggests
the portfolio approach is most important in South East Asia.
Apart from the US stock market, we have investigated whether the crisis could have
originated from any of the main neighbouring stock markets, in Japan, Hong Kong and China.
Although the crisis began in Thailand1 in 1997, others have suggested the crisis began earlier
than this, with both China/Hong Kong and Japan being suggested as contenders. Fernald et al.
(1999) have suggested that the rise in China’s economic strength during the 1990s added to
the crisis. They focused on the 1994 devaluation and subsequent strong export performance
as the cause of the troubles, as China captured export markets, which had previously been
dominated by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. This
facilitated current account problems, reduced company profitability and culminated in
the general financial demise of the area. It has also been argued that a further source of
the crisis could have been Hong Kong, which in 1997 was officially returned to China from
the UK. Initially this had a positive effect on Hong Kong’s share prices, but as the date for the
handover approached, so concern about investment in Hong Kong increased.
Some argue that another source of the crisis was Japan. Following rapid rises in the stock
market during the 1980s, the early and mid 1990s saw a reversal of this trend, with some
sharp falls. At the same time the Japanese economy experienced an era of stagnant growth
and lack of demand. This facilitated a decline in demand for ASEAN imports and a fall in
investment flows to these countries. The financial crisis in Japan culminated in the failure
of Yamaichi corporation in 1997, the fourth largest financial institution. This in turn caused
another large fall in the Japanese stock market.
If either Japan or China/Hong Kong were the instigators of this crisis, then a measure of
their financial troubles could be a useful leading indicator for the currency crises in East
Asia. To determine if this is the case, we have incorporated the stock market indices of
China, Hong Kong and Japan into the basic monetary based model, along with the domestic
stock market index.
3. Model
The following model is based on the Krugman (1979) model of currency crisis, with
stock market effects incorporated through the money demand specification. As with Edin
1 For a detailed description of the events leading to the crisis and the subsequent efforts to control the situation,
see Radelet and Sachs (1998).
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and Vredin (1993), this is only used as a basis for the empirical investigation and as with the
leading indicator literature in general, other related leading indicators are also incorporated
into the empirical tests, without specific theoretical modelling. The stock market is
included in the money demand function2 for three reasons, as suggested by Friedman
(1988). It primarily acts as a wealth effect, as a rise in stock prices increases nominal
wealth. Additionally a rise in stock prices reflects a rise in expected returns from risky
assets. To offset this rise in risk, agents switch away from long-term bonds to safer
monetary assets. Thirdly, a rise in stock prices implies a rise in financial transactions and
thus transactional demand for money. These imply a positive relationship between money
and stock prices. There could also be a negative relationship through a substitution effect.
As stock prices rise, agents substitute the more attractive equities for money. However, as
with Friedman (1988) we assume the positive effect dominates.
As with the conventional monetary model, we assume purchasing power parity (PPP)
and uncovered interest parity (UIP)3 hold:
et ¼ pt  pt (1)
where e is the exchange rate, p is the domestic price and p is the foreign price.
E
de
dt
 
¼ it  it (2)
where i is the domestic interest rate and i is the foreign rate. Money demand takes the
following form:
mt  pt ¼ fyt  lit þ wst (3)
where m is domestic money balances, y is domestic income and s is a domestic stock
market index. We have assumed that the domestic money supply is purely accommodating.
By rearranging the above equations, we get:
et ¼ mt þ lit þ pt  fy  wst þ
lde
dt
(4)
To test for the effects of stock prices on the exchange rate, we have chosen a standard
empirical model, based on Eq. (4).4 This suggests the crisis is a function of:
cc ¼ f ðDm;Dy;Di;Dp;Dds;Drer;Dres;DxsÞ (5)
2 The stock market could have been related to other macroeconomic variables, such as consumption, output
and investment. However, given the monetary basis of most currency crisis models, we have incorporated it into
the money demand function.
3 As with currency crisis models in general based on the monetary model, we have assumed PPP and UIP,
although empirical studies question whether the former holds due to trade impediments and transport costs and
the latter due to the presence of a risk premium.
4 An alternative approach would have been to include a variety of other relevant variables relating to the
banking sector, current account and political factors, as in Kaminsky et al. (1998). However, in order to provide a
theoretical basis for the empirical tests, the emphasis is on variables relating to the Friedman based monetary
model. In addition it would not be possible to incorporate all the potential leading indicators into the model, so
we have concentrated on those related to the stock market. The inclusion of current account effects into the basic
monetary model was beyond the scope of this paper.
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where cc is the rate of change in the exchange rate for the month when the exchange rate is
in a crisis condition. It takes a value of one when a depreciation is greater than 2% and zero
otherwise, m is the domestic money supply (M1), y is output, i is the US interest rate, p is
the US price level, ds is the domestic stock market index, Drer is the change in the real
exchange rate, res are foreign currency reserves and xs are the relevant foreign stock
market indexes (all variables are in logs and in change form).
As with Edin and Vredin (1993) we have also included the real exchange rate, rather than
the nominal exchange rate and added foreign exchange reserves. The relevant foreign stock
market indexes are the US, Japan, Hong Kong and China. The US stock market is included
because the East Asian currencies were pegged to the dollar, the Japanese markets have
traditionally had a strong effect on the region as a whole. China has recently undergone
important political changes which have affected their financial markets and Hong Kong has
been transferred from UK to Chinese control.In addition to the main leading indicator tests,
we have also included some panel based Granger causality tests (see Blomstrom, Lipsey, &
Zejan, 1996), between the exchange rates and domestic stock prices, as well as some
additional causality tests between the exchange rates and foreign stock price variables. The
basic tests are:
Deit ¼ a0 þ a1Deit1 þ a2Dsit1 þ ut
Dsit ¼ b0 þ b1Dsit1 þ b2Deit1 þ vt (6)
where e is the exchange rate, s is the stock price variable and u and v are error terms.
4. Data and results
The countries included in the investigation are those that experienced the worst problems
during the crisis. This includes Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, Indonesia and the
Philippines. The data is all monthly, running from January 1996 to December 1999, so
including months where a crisis was evident as well as months in which the exchange rate
was relatively stable. The exchange rate is expressed as the domestic currency in terms of
the US dollar, the foreign explanatory variables are the respective US variables. This
reflects the fact that the relevant currencies were initially all in effect pegged to the US
dollar. The data on prices, foreign exchange reserves, money supply, industrial output and
interest rates are taken from International Financial Statistics and Datastream. The stock
market data consists of the total return expressed in index form as supplied by Datastream.
This incorporates both the capital gain and dividend5 payment. In addition to the standard
currency crisis variables and the domestic stock market indices, we have also added stock
market variables from surrounding countries. This includes Hong Kong, China and Japan,
where the origins of the crisis are believed to have began, as well as the US stock market
variable.
5 Friedman suggests using a stock market index such as the main market index in his 1988 paper. However,
other studies have suggested using the return on equities and the dividend yield as an alternative measure of the
stock market. The Datastream index of stock prices includes both the capital gain and a dividend yield in the
index, where the dividend yield is treated as a further capital gain.
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The conventional Granger causality tests are reported in Table 1, as with Blomstrom et al.
(1996) we have included country dummy variables and use the t-statistic on the lagged
explanatory variable to determine if there is evidence of causality. The results suggest
evidence of bi-causality between the exchange rate and domestic stock prices, as found in
Kwack (2000). In addition there is evidence that the stock prices in China and particularly
Japan have affected the East Asian exchange rates.
A binomial probit6 is used to estimate the various models, where we define a crisis as a
depreciation of the currency in any month greater than 2%. This roughly equates with the
definition of a currency crisis given by Frankel and Rose (1996), which is a depreciation of
the exchange rate greater than 25% in any given year.7 Other values were also estimated,
but made little difference to the results. The model has been estimated using both fixed and
random effects, however, in all tests there are no significant differences between the results,
so only the fixed effects are reported.
The first model to be estimated is the basic model, in which the variables are lagged
once, incorporating only domestic stock prices. The result is presented in Table 2 and
suggests the domestic stock prices and US prices are significant leading indicators,
although other domestic variables are insignificant8 Other lag lengths were also added,
but tended not to be significant as financial markets adjust relatively quickly. The second
Table 1
Granger causality tests between stock prices and exchange rates
DE DDS
DE (1) 0.182 (1.916)**
DDS (1) 0.087 (1.674)**
DHKS (1) 0.074 (1.159)
DUSS (1) 0.070 (0.499)
DCHS (1) 0.076 (1.683)**
DJPS (1) 0.209 (1.927)**
Notes. t-statistics are in parentheses. E and DS are the domestic exchange rate and stock price, respectively.
HKS, USS, CHS and JPS are Hong Kong, US, China and Japan’s stock prices, respectively. The variables along
the first row are the dependent variables, the lagged explanatory variables are down the first column. Only one
lagged explanatory variable included. Causality results from the exchange rates to the foreign stock markets are
not included as are not relevant.
** Significance at the 10% level of significance.
6 The use of the probit econometric technique in the currency crisis literature is widespread but has a number
of associated weaknesses. It tends to lead to a limited definition of a currency crisis and does not take into
account the complicated and individual nature of a crisis (e.g., Radelet & Sachs, 1998). Other studies have used
the endogenous switching type of model (Edin & Vredin, 1993). However, this type of model was not suitable
for the East Asian financial crisis, as following the devaluations the financial regime changed, with the exchange
rate floating and capital controls reinstated.
7 We could have used various different definitions of a currency crisis, by incorporating movements in reserves
and interest rates into a crisis variable. As we are concentrating specifically on the exchange rate and stock price
relationship, we used only the exchange rate in our crisis variable. Radelet and Sachs (1998) use a similar
technique to that used here, however they define the crisis as being a sharp shift from a capital inflow to outflow.
8 As with other studies of the East Asian financial crisis, the domestic variables were generally not significant
leading indicators of the crisis. However, we assume that they are significant out of the crisis.
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model incorporates US stock prices, which are not significant, suggesting although the US
real economy affected the crisis, the US stock prices are not a good leading indicator
(Table 3).
In models 3 and 4, currency reserves and Thailand’s stock price are included in the basic
model. As with other studies reserves are not significant although the Thailand stock price
is significant at the 10% level of significance This is not surprising as the crisis began with
Table 2
Probit models using panel data from Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, Philippines and Indonesia
Variable 1 2 3 4
DM (1) 1.157 (1.709) 1.136 (1.681) 1.095 (1.596) 1.131 (1.442)
DDS (1) 0.6207* (2.363) 0.585* (2.186) 0.572* (2.170) 0.320 (0.847)
DUSP (1) 107.181* (11.195) 1.3.874* (9.488) 102.311* (9.916) 110.289* (10.234)
DUSS (1) 0.393 (0.615)
Usi (1) 0.064 (0.308) 0.073 (0.351) 0.007 (0.032) 0.057 (0.240)
DY (1) 0.608 (1.312) 0.629 (1.363) 0.708 (1.514) 0.636 (1.253)
DRER (1) 0.283 (0.807) 0.281 (0.807) 0.206 (0.577) 0.090 (0.232)
DRES (1) 0.796 (1.453)
DTHS(1) 0.471 (1.651)
L-L 122.031 121.841 120.956 97.229
Probability 70% 71% 73% 68%
Notes. t-statistics are in parentheses. Probability is the probability of a predicted outcome occurring from the 115
possible outcomes, acting as a pseudo-R2. M is the money supply, DS is the domestic stock price, USP, Usi and
USS are US prices, interest rates and stock prices, respectively. Y is output and THS are Thailand’s stock prices,
RER is the real exchange rate and RES are reserves. L-L is the restricted log likelihood.
* Significance at the 5% level.
Table 3
Probit models using panel data from Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, Philippines and Indonesia, including
foreign stock prices
Variable 1 2 3 4
DM (1) 1.061 (1.596) 1.129 (1.665) 1.116 (1.655) 1.071 (1.609)
DDS (1) 0.445 (1.668) 0.500 (1.860) 0.594* (2.265) 0.476 (1.747)
DUSP (1) 107.643* (12.306) 109.676* (11.680) 106.075* (11.008) 116.063* (10.558)
DUSS (1) 1.069 (1.224)
Usi (1) 0.041 (0.188) 0.082 (0.391) 0.110 (0.519) 0.064 (0.278)
DY (1) 0.573 (1.266) 0.535 (1.150) 0.683 (1.450) 0.578 (1.234)
DRER (1) 0.040 (0.114) 0.175 (0.500) 0.253 (0.718) 0.035 (0.097)
DJPS (1) 0.512 (0.820)
DCHS (1) 0.493* (2.292) 0.602 (1.093) 0.047 (0.164)
DHKS (1) 0.974* (3.072) 1.141* (2.234)
L-L 117.412 119.494 121.431 116.428
Probability 72% 72% 71% 73%
Notes. See Tables 1 and 2.
* Significance at the 5% level.
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the collapse of Thailand’s stock market. The domestic variables are generally not important
predictors of the crisis, including the change in the real exchange rate, which as in Radelet
and Sachs (1998) is insignificant. This result tends to support the contention of many
observers who suggest there were very few domestic indicators of the impending crisis in
these economies (e.g., Furman & Stiglitz, 1998; Radelet & Sachs, 1998).
The further inclusion of the Japanese, Chinese and Hong Kong stock prices individually
into the model, shows that except for the Japanese stock market, these are significant,
which supports the theory that the origins of the currency crisis was not the relatively small
domestic stock markets, but the more powerful stock markets of some of the neighbouring
economies, particularly Hong Kong. All three stock markets are negatively signed, again
suggesting that the falls in the respective markets precipitated the currency crisis. The
probability of predicting an outcome correctly is reasonably high at about 70%9 in each
case.
The final set of tests involves all three neighbouring stock markets included in the model.
Only the Hong Kong market is significant of the three main East Asian markets. This
provides possible evidence that the instability within the ASEAN countries may have been
affected by Hong Kong’s financial markets. The instability in these markets was caused
primarily by the change in ownership of Hong Kong in 1997, when China took over
administrative control from the UK. However, Hong Kong did not suffer from a currency
crisis itself, this may be due to the larger size and greater development of its financial
markets as suggested by Radelet and Sachs (1998) or due to the authorities using their
reserves to purchase equities, thus preventing a collapse on the Hang Seng.
5. Conclusion
This paper provides evidence of the domestic stock market being a significant leading
indicator of the recent East Asian currency crisis, unlike other domestic variables.
Although the most significant leading indicator of the crisis were US prices. In general,
the effectiveness of the domestic stock prices is less powerful as a leading indicator than the
stock prices of the main economies in East Asia, particularly that of Hong Kong.
The results in general support the evidence from other similar studies on the East Asian
crisis, as there is little evidence that in general the domestic fundamentals could have been
used to predict the crisis. However, it could have been possible to predict the crisis, based
on the main neighbouring foreign stock markets, particularly the Hong Kong stock market.
This implies that volatility in the Hong Kong economy and financial markets in 1997 may
have affected these neighbouring economies. This supports the various contagion theories,
although it does not explain why some financial markets survived the crisis better than
others.
Finally, although this model could act as an important early warning system, it has a
number of limitations. These mainly relate to the individual nature of most crises, where
different institutional and political factors affect the crises in different ways. However, the
9 However, this is in effect an in-sample forecast. Using an out-of-sample forecast, as is usually the case with
policy makers, is likely to lead to a smaller probability of correctly predicting a crisis.
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intervention in the Hong Kong stock market by the authorities during the crisis, may have
saved Hong Kong from a similar fate to its neighbours and provides the possibility of a
mechanism for preventing such crises from occurring in the future. This could form part of
an area for future research, as could the use of daily rather than monthly data as such data
becomes more available.
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